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Abstract
In this paper we study the class of brutal base contractions
that are based on a bounded ensconcement and also the class
of severe withdrawals which are based on bounded epistemic
entrenchment relations that are defined by means of bounded
ensconcements (using the procedure proposed by Mary-Anne
Williams). We present axiomatic characterizations for each
one of those classes of functions and investigate the interrela-
tion among them.
1 Introduction
The central goal underlying the research area of logic of the-
ory change is the study of the changes which can occur in
the belief state of a rational agent when he receives new in-
formation.
The most well known model of theory change was
proposed by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson (1985)
and is, nowadays, known as the AGM model. Assuming
that the belief state of an agent is modelled by a belief set
(i.e. a logically closed set of sentences), this framework
essentially provides a definition for contractions — i.e.
functions that receive a sentence (representing the new
information received by the agent), and return a belief set
which is a subset of the original one that does not contain
the received sentence. In the mentioned paper, the class of
partial meet contractions was introduced and axiomatically
characterized. Subsequently several constructive models
have been presented for the class of contraction functions
proposed in the AGM framework (such as the system of
spheres-based contractions (Grove 1988), safe/kernel con-
tractions (Alchourro´n and Makinson 1985; Hansson 1994),
and the epistemic entrenchment-based contractions
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1988)). Also
several adaptations and variations of those constructive
models have been presented and studied in the literature
as it is the case, for example, of severe withdrawals
(or mild contractions or Rott’s contractions) (Rott 1991;
Rott and Pagnucco 1999) which results of simplifying the
definition of epistemic entrenchment-based contractions.
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Although the AGM model has quickly acquired the status
of standard model of theory change, several researchers (for
an overview see (Ferme´ and Hansson 2011)) have pointed
out its inadequateness in several contexts and proposed sev-
eral extensions and generalizations to that framework. One
of the most relevant of the proposed extensions of the AGM
model of contraction is to use sets of sentences not (neces-
sarily) closed under logical consequence — which are des-
ignated belief bases — rather than belief sets to represent
belief states.
Hence, several of the existing models (of AGM contrac-
tions) were generalized to the case when belief states are
represented by belief bases instead of belief sets. Among
those we emphasize the ensconcement-based contractions
and the brutal base contractions (of belief bases) proposed
in (Williams 1995), which can be seen as adaptations to the
case of belief bases of the epistemic entrenchment-based
contractions and of the severe withdrawals, respectively. In
fact, the definitions of those operations are both based on the
concept of ensconcement, which is an adaptation of the con-
cept of epistemic entrenchment relation to the case of belief
bases. In the mentioned paper Mary-Anne Williams has also
presented a method for constructing an epistemic entrench-
ment from an ensconcement relation.
In the present paper we will study the interrelation among
brutal base contractions (of belief bases) and severe with-
drawals (of belief sets). More precisely, we will devote
special attention to the class of brutal base contractions
which are based on bounded ensconcements — the so-
called bounded brutal base contractions — and also to
the class of the so-called ensconcement-based severe with-
drawals, which is formed by the severe withdrawals that
are based on an epistemic entrenchment relation defined
from a bounded ensconcement using Mary-Anne William’s
method. We shall provide axiomatic characterizations to
each one of those classes of functions and study the inter-
relation among them.
This paper is organized as follows: Firstly we provide
the notation and background needed for the rest of the pa-
per. After that we provide axiomatic characterizations for
the classes of bounded brutal base contractions and of
ensconcement-based severe withdrawals. Furthermore we
show how to define a bounded brutal base contraction from
an ensconcement-based severe withdrawal and vice-versa.
Finally, we briefly summarize the main contributions of
the paper. In the appendix we provide proofs for the the-
orems. Proofs for all the remaining results are available at
http://www.cee.uma.pt/ferme/GFR16-full.pdf.
2 Background
2.1 Formal preliminaries
We will assume a language L that is closed under truth-
functional operations and a consequence operator Cn for
L. Cn satisfies the standard Tarskian properties, namely
inclusion (A ⊆ Cn(A)), monotony (if A ⊆ B, then
Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B)), and iteration (Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A))).
It is supraclassical and compact, and satisfies deduction (if
β ∈ Cn(A ∪ {α}), then (α → β) ∈ Cn(A)). A ⊢ α will
be used as an alternative notation for α ∈ Cn(A), ⊢ α for
α ∈ Cn(∅) and Cn(α) for Cn({α}). Upper-case letters de-
note subsets of L. Lower-case Greek letters denote elements
of L.
A well-ranked preorder on a set X is a preorder such that
every nonempty subset of X has a minimal member, and
similarly an inversely well-ranked preorder on a set X is a
preorder such that every nonempty subset of X has a maxi-
mal member. A total preorder on X is bounded if and only
if it is both well-ranked and inversely well-ranked.1
2.2 AGM
The AGM model of belief change was proposed by
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson (1985) and acquired
the status of standard model of belief change. In this model
beliefs are represented by a set of sentences closed un-
der logical consequence. In the AGM framework there are
three operations to be considered, namely expansion, con-
traction and revision. Expansion, consists of adding new
information (represented by sentences) in the original set
preserving logical closure. Contraction, consists of elimi-
nating sentences from a belief set, in such a way that the
remaining set does not imply a specified sentence. Revi-
sion, consists in incorporating a sentence in the original set,
but (eventually) eliminating some sentences in order to re-
tain consistency of the revised set. AGM has been char-
acterized in, at least five, different ways: Postulates, par-
tial meet functions, epistemic entrenchment,safe/kernel con-
traction and Grove’ sphere-systems (for an overview see
(Ferme´ and Hansson 2011)).
One of the Postulates included in the axiomatic characteri-
zation of the contraction operator is recovery:
(Recovery) K ⊆ (K − α) + α
Recovery is based in the principle that “it is reason-
able to require that we get all of the beliefs [...] back
again after first contracting and then expanding with re-
spect to the same belief” (Ga¨rdenfors 1982). Neverthe-
less, the recovery postulate have been criticized by sev-
eral authors (Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1991; Levi 1991;
1In (Williams 1994a) a preorder in these conditions is desig-
nated by finite, however we think it is more adequate to use the
denomination bounded.
Niedere´e 1991) as a general principle that contractions
should hold. Alternative contraction models were proposed
in which the recovery postulate does not hold, for in-
stance: Levi Contraction (Levi 1991), Severe Withdrawal
(Rott 1991; Rott and Pagnucco 1999) and Semi-contraction
(Ferme´ 1998).
2.3 Epistemic Entrenchment
Epistemic entrenchment was introduced in
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1988) and
relies on the idea that contractions on a belief set K should
be based on an ordering of its sentences according to their
epistemic entrenchment. When a belief set K is contracted
it is prefered to give up beliefs with lower entrechment over
others with a higher entrechment. Ga¨rdenfors proposed the
following set of axioms that an epistemic entrechment order
≤ related to a belief set K should satisfy:
(EE1) If α ≤ β and β ≤ γ, then α ≤ γ (Transitivity)
(EE2) If α ⊢ β, then α ≤ β (Dominance)
(EE3) α ≤ (α ∧ β) or β ≤ (α ∧ β) (Conjunctiveness)
(EE4) If K 6⊢⊥, then α 6∈ K if and only if α ≤ β for all β
(Minimality)
(EE5) If β ≤ α for all β, then ⊢ α (Maximality)
If ≤ is well-ranked and inversely well-ranked, then the
epistemic entrenchment is well-ranked and inversely well-
ranked, and therefore is a bounded epistemic entrenchment.
The relation ≤ of epistemic entrenchment is independent
of the change functions in the sense that it does not refer to
any contraction or revision function. In addition to stating
the axioms of entrenchment, Ga¨rdenfors proposed the
following entrenchment-based contraction functions:
(G≤) β ∈ K−α if and only if β ∈ K and, either ⊢ α or
α < (α ∨ β)
The crucial clause of (G≤) is α < (α ∨ β). This clause
can be justified with reference to the recovery postulate
(Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1988).
Severe withdrawal: Rott (1991) proposed a more
intuitive alternative definition, later called Severe with-
drawal (or mild contraction or Rott’s contraction)
(Rott and Pagnucco 1999):
(R≤) β ∈ K−α if and only if β ∈ K and, either ⊢ α or
α < β
Arlo´-Costa and Levi (2006) have analyzed it in terms
of minimal loss of informational value. It has been shown
to satisfy the implausible postulate of expulsiveness. (If
6⊢ α and 6⊢ β, then either α 6∈ K ÷ β or β 6∈ K ÷ α)
(Hansson 1999b). Lindstro¨m and Rabinowicz (1991) ab-
stained from recommending either a particularly expulsive
contraction (severe withdrawal) or a particularly retentive
one (AGM contraction). They argued that these extremes
should be taken as “upper” and “lower” bounds and
that any “reasonable” contraction function should be
situated between them. This condition was called the Lind-
stro¨m’s and Rabinowicz’s interpolation thesis (Rott 1995).
Severe withdrawal was axiomatized independently by
Rott and Pagnucco (1999) and by Ferme´ and Rodriguez
(1998). The following set of postulates characterize severe
withdrawals (Rott and Pagnucco 1999):
(÷1) K ÷ α = Cn(K ÷ α)
(÷2) K ÷ α ⊆ K
(÷3) If α 6∈ K or ⊢ α, then K ⊆ K ÷ α
(÷4) If 6⊢ α, then α 6∈ K ÷ α
(÷6) If Cn(α) = Cn(β), then K ÷ α = K ÷ β
(÷7a) If 6⊢ α, then K ÷ α ⊆ K ÷ (α ∧ β)
(÷8) If α 6∈ K ÷ (α ∧ β), then K ÷ (α ∧ β) ⊆ K ÷ α
Severe withdrawal also satisfies the following postulates:
(÷10) If 6⊢ α and α ∈ K ÷ β, then K ÷ α ⊆ K ÷ β.
(Linearity) Either K ÷ α ⊆ K ÷ β or K ÷ β ⊆ K ÷ α.
(Expulsiveness) If 6⊢ α and 6⊢ β, then either α 6∈ K ÷ β or
β 6∈ K ÷ α.
Rott and Pagnucco (1999) showed that an alternative
axiomatization of severe withdrawals consists of the postu-
lates (÷1) to (÷4) and (÷6) and:
(÷9) If α 6∈ K ÷ β, then K ÷ β ⊆ K ÷ α.
2.4 Ensconcement
Williams (1992; 1995) defines an ensconcement relation on
a belief base A as a transitive and connected relation  that
satisfies the following three conditions:2
(1) If β ∈ A \ Cn(∅), then {α ∈ A : β ≺ α} 6⊢ β
(2) If 6⊢ α and ⊢ β, then α ≺ β, for all α, β ∈ A
(3) If ⊢ α and ⊢ β, then α  β, for all α, β ∈ A
( 1) says that the formulae that are strictly more en-
sconced than α do not (even conjointly) imply α. Conditions
( 2) and ( 3) say that tautologies are the most ensconced
formulae. If is well-ranked/inversely well-ranked, then the
ensconcement (A,) is well-ranked/inversely well-ranked.
If  is both well-ranked and inversely well-ranked then it is
a bounded ensconcement.
Given an ensconcement relation, a cut operator for α ∈
Cn(A) is defined by:
cut(α) = {β ∈ A : {γ ∈ A : β ≺ γ} 6⊢ α}.
A proper cut for α ∈ L is defined by:
cut≺(α) = {β ∈ A : {γ ∈ A : β  γ} 6⊢ α}
2 α ≺ β means α  β and β 6 α. α = β means α  β and
β  α.
Observation 1 (Williams 1994a)
If α ∈ A, cut≺(α) = {β ∈ A : α ≺ β}
The previous observation says that when α is an explicit
belief, its proper cut is the subset of A such that its mem-
bers are strictly more ensconced than α. Other properties of
proper cut are:
Observation 2 Let (A,) be a bounded ensconcement and
α, β ∈ Cn(A), then:
(a) Let 6⊢ β. If cut≺(α) ⊆ cut≺(β), then cut(α) ⊆
cut(β).
(b) If ⊢ β and 6⊢ α, then cut(β) ⊂ cut(α).
Intuitively, an ensconcement is to belief bases as epis-
temic entrenchment is to belief sets. Williams explores this
relation:
Definition 3 (Williams 1994b) Let (A,) be an ensconce-
ment. For α, β ∈ L, define ≤ to be given by: α ≤ β if
and only if either:
i) α 6∈ Cn(A), or ii) α, β ∈ Cn(A) and cut(β) ⊆
cut(α).
Observation 4 (Williams 1994b) If (A,) is an enscon-
cement, then ≤ is an epistemic entrenchment related to
Cn(A).
Observation 5 (Williams 1994b) Given an ensconcement
(A,),  is well-ranked (inversely well-ranked, bounded)
if and only if ≤ is well-ranked (inversely well-ranked,
bounded).
2.5 Brutal Contraction
Mary-Anne Williams (Williams 1994b) defines two opera-
tors for base contraction: The first one inspired in AGM con-
traction (ensconcement-based contraction) and the second
one inspired in severe withdraw (brutal contraction). In this
paper we will focus in the second one. Brutal contraction, as
Mary-Anne Williams says, “retains as little as necessary of
the theory base”.
Definition 6 (Williams 1994b) Let A be a belief base. An
operation − is a brutal base contraction on A if and only if
there is an ensconcement relation  on A such that:
β ∈ A− α if and only if β ∈ A and either (i) α ∈ Cn(∅)
or (ii) β ∈ cut≺(α)
In (Garapa, Ferme´, and Reis 2016) the following ax-
iomatic characterization for brutal base contractions was
presented:
Observation 7 (Garapa, Ferme´, and Reis 2016) Let A be a
belief base. An operator − of A is a brutal base contraction
on A if and only if it satisfies:
(Success) If 6⊢ α, then A− α 6⊢ α
(Inclusion) A− α ⊆ A
(Vacuity) If A 6⊢ α, then A ⊆ A− α
(Failure) If ⊢ α, then A− α = A
(Relative Closure) A ∩Cn(A− α) ⊆ A− α
(Strong Inclusion) If A− β 6⊢ α, then A− β ⊆ A− α
(Uniform Behaviour) If β ∈ A,A ⊢ α andA−α = A−β,
then α ∈ Cn(A− β ∪ {γ ∈ A : A− β = A− γ})
The following observation lists some other well-known
postulates which are satisfied by the brutal base contraction
functions.
Observation 8 (Garapa, Ferme´, and Reis 2016) Let A be a
belief base and − an operator on A that satisfies success,
inclusion, vacuity, failure, relative closure, strong inclusion
and uniform behaviour. Then − satisfies:
(a) If α ∈ A \A− β, then A− β ⊆ A− α.
(b) If A− α ⊂ A− β, then A− β ⊢ α.
(c) If ⊢ α and α ∈ A, then α ∈ A− β.
(d) If ⊢ α↔ β, then A− α = A− β. (Extensionality)
3 Bounded Brutal Base Contraction
Functions
In this subsection we introduce the bounded brutal base con-
tractions and obtain an axiomatic characterization for that
class of functions.
Definition 9 Let A be a belief base. An operation − is a
bounded brutal base contraction on A if and only if it is a
brutal base contraction based on a bounded ensconcement.
We introduce the following postulates:
(Upper Bound) For every non-empty set X ⊆ A of
nontautological formulae, there exists α ∈ X such that
A− β ⊆ A− α for all β ∈ X
(Lower Bound) For every non-empty set X ⊆ A of
nontautological formulae, there exists α ∈ X such that
A− α ⊆ A− β for all β ∈ X
(Clustering) If β ∈ A, then there exists α ∈ A ∪ Cn(∅)
such that A− α = A− β ∪ {γ ∈ A : A− β = A− γ}
Upper Bound (respectively Lower Bound) states that ev-
ery non-empty set of nontautological formulae ofA contains
an element which is such that the result of contracting A by
that sentence is a superset (respectively a subset) of any set
which results of contracting A by one of the remaining sen-
tences of that subset.
Clustering asserts that for any sentence β inA there exists
some sentence α in A ∪ Cn(∅) such that the result of the
contraction of α from A is the set consisting of the union of
the result of contractingA by β with the set formed by all the
sentences of A which are such that the result of contracting
it from A coincides with the result of contractingA by β.
The two following observations present some interrela-
tions among the above proposed postulates and some of the
of the postulates included in the axiomatic characterization
that was obtained for the class of brutal base contraction.
Observation 10 LetA be a belief base and− an operator on
A that satisfies success, inclusion, failure, relative closure,
strong inclusion and lower bound. Then − satisfies cluster-
ing.
Observation 11 Let A be a belief base and − an operator
on A that satisfies failure, success, strong inclusion and clus-
tering. Then − satisfies uniform behaviour.
We are now in a position to present an axiomatic charac-
terization for the class of bounded brutal base contractions.
Theorem 12 (Axiomatic characterization of bounded brutal
base contraction functions) Let A be a belief base. An oper-
ator− onA is a bounded brutal base contraction onA if and
only if it satisfies success, inclusion, vacuity, failure, relative
closure, lower bound, upper bound and strong inclusion.
The following observation exposes another relevant prop-
erty of the bounded brutal base contractions which will be
useful further ahead. More precisely, it asserts that for any
non-tautological sentence α which is deducible from A it
holds that the result of contracting A by α coincides with
the result of the contraction of A by some sentence explic-
itly included in A.
Observation 13 LetA be a belief base and− an operator on
A that satisfies success, inclusion, failure, relative closure,
strong inclusion and lower bound. Then − satisfies:
For all α ∈ Cn(A) \ Cn(∅) there exists β ∈ A such that
A− α = A− β.
4 Relation between Bounded Brutal Base
Contraction and Ensconcement-based
Severe Withdrawal
In this section we will define and axiomatically character-
ize a particular kind of severe withdrawals which we will
show to be the contraction functions that correspond to the
bounded brutal base contractions in the context of belief set
contractions.
We start by noticing that, given a bounded ensconcement
(A,), we can combine Definitions 3 and (R≤) in order to
define a contraction function on the belief set Cn(A). This
kind of functions is formally introduced in the following def-
inition.
Definition 14 ÷ is an ensconcement-based withdrawal re-
lated to (A,) if and only if (A,) is a bounded ensconce-
ment such that Cn(A) ÷ α = Cn(A) ÷≤ α, where ≤ is
the epistemic entrenchment with respect to Cn(A) defined
by Definition 3 and÷≤ is the severe withdrawal onCn(A)
defined by (R≤).
Comparing the above definition with Definitions 6 and 9 it
becomes clear that there is a strong interrelation among the
ensconcement-based severe withdrawals and the (bounded)
brutal base contractions. That interrelation is explicitly pre-
sented in the two following theorems. More precisely, given
a bounded ensconcement (A,), these two results expose
how the -based brutal contraction on A can be defined
from the ensconcement-based withdrawal related to (A,)
and, vice-versa, how the latter can be defined by means of
the former.
Theorem 15 Let (A,) be a bounded ensconcement,
− be the -based brutal contraction, and ÷≤ be the
ensconcement-based severe withdrawal related to (A,),
then A− α = (Cn(A) ÷≤ α) ∩ A.
Theorem 16 Let (A,) be a bounded ensconcement,
− be the -based brutal contraction, and ÷≤ be the
ensconcement-based severe withdrawal related to (A,),
then Cn(A)÷≤ α = Cn(A − α).
4.1 Axiomatic Characterization of
ensconcement-based severe withdrawals
In this subsection we will present an axiomatic charac-
terization for the class of ensconcement-based severe with-
drawals. To do that we must start by introducing the follow-
ing postulate:
(Base-reduction) If Cn(A) ÷ α ⊢ β, then
(Cn(A) ÷ α) ∩ A ⊢ β
This postulate essentially states that that the result of con-
tracting the belief set Cn(A) by any sentence α coincides
with the logical closure of some subset of A. Indeed, it is
not hard to see that base-reduction is equivalent to the fol-
lowing postulate: ∀α∃A′ ⊆ A : Cn(A′) = Cn(A) ÷ α
(which is very similar to the postulate of finitude proposed
by Hansson (1999a)).
The following observation highlights that for a severe
withdrawal that satisfies the postulates of base-reduction and
lower bound it also holds that for any non-tautological sen-
tence α in Cn(A) the result of the contraction of Cn(A) by
α coincides with the result of the contraction of Cn(A) by
some sentence in A.
Observation 17 Let ÷ be an operator on Cn(A) that sat-
isfies (÷1), (÷2), (÷4), (÷9), base-reduction and lower
bound, then for all α ∈ Cn(A) \ Cn(∅) there exists β ∈ A
such that Cn(A) ÷ α = Cn(A)÷ β.
We are now in a position to present the following ax-
iomatic characterization for the ensconcement-based severe
withdrawals.
Theorem 18 Let A be a belief base and ÷ be an operator
on Cn(A). ÷ satisfies (÷1) to (÷4), (÷6), (÷9), base-
reduction, upper bound and lower bound if and only if
there exists a bounded ensconcement such that ÷ is an
ensconcement-based withdrawal related to (A,).
Theorems 15 and 16 expose how a base contraction func-
tion can be defined from a belief set contraction function
and, vice-versa. Combining those two results with the ax-
iomatic characterizations presented in Theorems 12 and 18
we can obtain the following results which highlight the cor-
respondence among sets of postulates for base contraction
and sets of postulates for belief set contraction.
Corollary 19 An operator − on A satisfies success, inclu-
sion, vacuity, failure, relative closure, strong inclusion, up-
per bound and lower bound if and only if there exists an
operator ÷ on Cn(A) that satisfies (÷1) to (÷4), (÷6),
(÷9), base-reduction, upper bound and lower bound such
that: A− α = Cn(A ÷ α) ∩ A.
Corollary 20 An operator ÷ on Cn(A) satisfies (÷1) to
(÷4), (÷6), (÷9), base-reduction, upper bound and lower
bound if and only if there exists an operator − on A that
satisfies success, inclusion, vacuity, failure, relative closure,
strong inclusion, upper bound and lower bound such that:
Cn(A)÷ α = Cn(A− α).
The two following observations consist of a slight refine-
ment of the right to left part of Corollary 20. More precisely
these results specify more precisely which properties of the
belief base contraction are needed in order to assure that the
belief set contraction obtained from it as exposed in Theo-
rem 16 satisfies certain postulates.
Observation 21 Let A be a belief base and − be an oper-
ator on A that satisfies success, inclusion, vacuity, failure,
relative closure and strong inclusion. If ÷ is an operator on
Cn(A) defined byCn(A)÷α = Cn(A−α) then÷ satisfies
(÷1) to (÷4), (÷6), (÷9) and base-reduction.
Observation 22 Let A be a belief base and − be an opera-
tor onA that satisfies success, inclusion, failure, relative clo-
sure, upper bound, lower bound and strong inclusion. If÷ is
an operator on Cn(A) defined byCn(A)÷α = Cn(A−α)
then ÷ satisfies upper bound and lower bound.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an axiomatic characterizations for the
subclass of brutal base contractions formed by the brutal
contractions that are based on a bounded ensconcement re-
lation. We have also introduced and axiomatically charac-
terized the class of ensconcement-based severe withdrawals
which is formed by the severe withdrawals that are based
on epistemic entrenchment relations which are obtained
from an ensconcement relation using the construction pro-
posed by Mary-Anne Williams. Some results were presented
concerning the interrelation among the classes of bounded
brutal base contractions and of ensconcement-based severe
withdrawals. Finally we presented some results relating base
contraction postulates and belief set contraction postulates
by means of explicit definitions of belief set contractions
from base contractions and vice-versa.
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Appendix: Proofs
Previous Lemmas
Lemma 23 (Ferme´, Krevneris, and Reis 2008)
(a) If 6⊢ α, cut≺(α) 6⊢ α.
(b) If A 6⊢ α, cut≺(α) = A.
(c) If β ⊢ α, then cut≺(α) ⊆ cut≺(β).
(d) If α  β, then cut≺(β) ⊆ cut≺(α).
(e) If cut≺(α) ⊢ β, then cut≺(α ∧ β) = cut≺(α).
(f) If cut≺(α) 6⊢ β, then cut≺(α ∧ β) = cut≺(β).
Lemma 24 (Rott and Pagnucco 1999, Observation 19(ii))
If ÷ is a severe withdrawal function, then ÷ can be repre-
sented as an entrenchement-based withdrawal where the re-
lation ≤ on which ÷ is based is obtained by
(Def≤ from ÷) α ≤ β if and only if α 6∈ K ÷ β or ⊢ β
and ≤ satisfies (EE1) to (EE5).
Lemma 25 Let (A,) be a bounded ensconcement and
cut(α) 6= ∅. Then there exists β ∈ cut(α) such that
cut(β) = cut(α).
Lemma 26 Let (A,) be a bounded ensconcement and
α ∈ Cn(A). Then cut(α) ⊢ α.
Lemma 27 Let (A,) be a bounded ensconcement and
α, β ∈ Cn(A). If cut≺(α) ⊂ cut≺(β), then cut(α) ⊂
cut(β).
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 12
From bounded brutal base contraction to postulates
Let − be a bounded brutal base contraction operator on A.
By Observation 7 − satisfies success, inclusion, vacuity,
failure, relative closure and strong inclusion. It remains to
show that − satisfies upper bound and lower bound.
Upper Bound Let X ⊆ A be a non empty set of non-
tautological formulae. Since  is well ranked there exists
β ∈ X such that β  α for all α ∈ X . Hence, by
Lemma 23 (d), there exists β ∈ X for all α ∈ X such that
cut≺(α) ⊆ cut≺(β). Therefore, by definition of − there
exists β ∈ X for all α ∈ X such that A− α ⊆ A− β.
Lower Bound Analogous to upper bound.
From postulates to bounded brutal base contraction
Let − be an operator on A that satisfies success, inclusion,
vacuity, failure, relative closure, lower bound, upper bound
and strong inclusion. From Observation 10 and Observation
11 it follows that − satisfies uniform behaviour. Let  be
defined by:
α  β iff
{
A− β ⊆ A− α and 6⊢ α
or
⊢ β
According to the Postulates to Construction part of the
proof of Observation 7  satisfies ( 1) - ( 3) and is such
that
A− α =
{
cut≺(α) if 6⊢ α
A otherwise
It remains to prove that  is bounded. To do so we must
prove that  is well-ranked and inversely well-ranked.
( is well-ranked) Let X 6= ∅ and X ⊆ A. We will prove
by cases:
Case 1) All formulae in X are tautologies. Let β be one of
those formulas. Hence by ( 3) β  α for all α ∈ X .
Case 2) All formulae in X are non-tautological. By upper
bound there exists β ∈ X such that A − α ⊆ A − β for all
α ∈ X . Hence, by definition of , there exists β ∈ X such
that β  α for all α ∈ X .
Case 3) There are some formulae in X , that are tautological
and others that are not. Consider X ′ = X \ Cn(∅). Hence,
by the previous case, there exists β ∈ X ′ such that β  α′
for all α′ ∈ X ′. Therefore, it follows from ( 3) that β  α
for all α ∈ X .
( is inversely well-ranked) Let X 6= ∅ and X ⊆ A. We
will prove by cases:
Case 1) There are some β ∈ X such that ⊢ β. Then, by
definition of , α  β for all α ∈ X .
Case 2) All formulae in X are non-tautological. By lower
bound there exists β ∈ X such that A − β ⊆ A − α for all
α ∈ X . Hence, by definition of , there exists β ∈ X such
that α  β for all α ∈ X .
Proof of Theorem 15
We will prove by cases:
Case 1) ⊢ α. It follows that A − α = A and (Cn(A) ÷≤
α) ∩A = A.
Case 2) A 6⊢ α. It follows that (Cn(A) ÷≤ α) ∩ A = A
and that A − α = cut≺(α). By Lemma 23 (b), it follows
that cut≺(α) = A.
Case 3)A ⊢ α and 6⊢ α.
We will prove that A−α = (Cn(A)÷≤ α)∩A by double
inclusion.
(⊆) Let β ∈ A − α. It follows that β ∈ A. It remains to
prove that β ∈ Cn(A) ÷≤ α, i.e. that β ∈ {ψ ∈ Cn(A) :
cut(ψ) ⊂ cut(α)}.
If ⊢ β. It follows trivially by Observation 2 (b).
Assume now that 6⊢ β. β ∈ cut≺(α). Hence cut≺(β) ⊂
cut≺(α). It follows, from Lemma 27 that cut(β) ⊂
cut(α).
(⊇) Let β ∈ (Cn(A) ÷≤ α) ∩ A. If ⊢ β, then it follows
from ( 2) that {ψ ∈ A : β  ψ} ⊆ Cn(∅). Therefore,
since 6⊢ α, it follows that β ∈ cut≺(α) = A − α. Assume
now that 6⊢ β. From β ∈ (Cn(A) ÷≤ α) ∩ A it follows
that β ∈ A and cut(β) ⊂ cut(α). Hence there exists
γ ∈ A such that γ ∈ cut(α) and γ 6∈ cut(β). Hence,
{ψ ∈ A : γ ≺ ψ} 6⊢ α and {ψ ∈ A : γ ≺ ψ} ⊢ β. Assume
by reductio that β 6∈ A − α i.e. that β 6∈ cut≺(α). Hence,
{ψ ∈ A : β  ψ} ⊢ α. From {ψ ∈ A : β  ψ} ⊢ α
and {ψ ∈ A : γ ≺ ψ} 6⊢ α it follows that β  γ.
Therefore, since {ψ ∈ A : γ ≺ ψ} ⊢ β, it follows that
{ψ ∈ A : β ≺ ψ} ⊢ β which contradicts ( 1).
Proof of Theorem 16
We will prove by cases:
Case 1) ⊢ α. ThenCn(A)÷≤α = Cn(A) andA−α = A.
Hence Cn(A− α) = Cn(A) = Cn(A) ÷≤ α.
Case 2) A 6⊢ α. Then Cn(A) ÷≤ α = Cn(A) and, by
Lemma 23 (b),A−α = cut≺(α) = A. HenceCn(A−α) =
Cn(A) = Cn(A) ÷≤ α.
Case 3)A ⊢ α and 6⊢ α. Hence Cn(A) ÷ α = {ψ ∈
Cn(A) : α < ψ} = {ψ ∈ Cn(A) : cut(ψ) ⊂
cut(α)}. We will prove that Cn(A−α) = Cn(A)÷≤ α
by double inclusion.
(⊆) Let β ∈ Cn(A − α). If ⊢ β, then β ∈ Cn(A)
and, by Observation 2 (b), cut(β) ⊂ cut(α). Hence
β ∈ Cn(A) ÷ α.
Assume now that 6⊢ β. From β ∈ Cn(A− α) it follows that
cut≺(α) ⊢ β. Hence, by Lemma 23 (e), cut≺(α ∧ β) =
cut≺(α). From α ∧ β ⊢ β by Lemma 23 (c) it follows
that cut≺(β) ⊆ cut≺(α ∧ β). Hence cut≺(β) ⊆ cut≺(α).
From which, together with Lemma 23 (a) and cut≺(α) ⊢ β
it follows that cut≺(β) ⊂ cut≺(α). Hence, by Lemma
27, it follows that cut(β) ⊂ cut(α). Therefore, since
β ∈ Cn(A), it follows that β ∈ Cn(A)÷≤ α.
(⊇) Let β ∈ Cn(A) ÷≤ α. Hence, β ∈ Cn(A) and
cut(β) ⊂ cut(α). Assume by reductio that β 6∈ Cn(A−
α). Therefore cut≺(α) 6⊢ β. By Lemma 23 (f) it follows that
cut≺(α ∧ β) = cut≺(β). From α ∧ β ⊢ α, by Lemma 23
(c), it follows that cut≺(α) ⊆ cut≺(β). From Observation
2 (a) it follows that cut(α) ⊆ cut(β). Contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 18
(⇐) Let ÷ be an ensconcement-based withdrawal related
to (A,) and let ≤=≤. Hence ÷ satisfies the postulates
for severe withdrawals. It remains to show that ÷ satisfies:
base-reduction, upper bound and lower bound.
Upper Bound: Let ÷ be an ensconcement-based
withdrawal related to (A,). Let X 6= ∅ and
X ⊆ Cn(A) \ Cn(∅). From Observation 5, since
(A,) is a bounded ensconcement, it follows that ≤ is
bounded. Hence, there exists β ∈ X such that β ≤ α for all
α ∈ X . We will prove that Cn(A) ÷ α ⊆ Cn(A) ÷ β for
all α ∈ X . Let γ ∈ Cn(A) ÷ α. Hence, by definition of ÷,
γ ∈ Cn(A) and α < γ. By EE1, since β ≤ α and α < γ
it follows that β < γ. Hence γ ∈ Cn(A) ÷ β. Therefore
Cn(A)÷ α ⊆ Cn(A)÷ β.
Lower Bound: Analogous to upper bound.
Base-reduction: Let Cn(A) ÷ α ⊢ β. We will prove that
(Cn(A) ÷ α) ∩ A ⊢ β by cases:
Case 1) ⊢ β. Follows trivially.
Case 2) α 6∈ Cn(A) or ⊢ α. Follows trivially by (R≤).
Case 3) 6⊢ β, α ∈ Cn(A) and 6⊢ α. From
Cn(A) ÷ α ⊢ β it follows, by (R≤), that X ⊢ β where
X = {ψ ∈ Cn(A) : cut(ψ) ⊂ cut(α)}.X\Cn(∅) 6= ∅,
since 6⊢ β. Let ψ ∈ X \ Cn(∅). Assume that cut(ψ) = ∅
and let θ ∈ Cn(∅). Hence, by EE5, it follows that
ψ < θ. Hence, by Definition 3, cut(θ) ⊂ cut(ψ) = ∅.
Contradiction. Hence cut(ψ) 6= ∅. From Lemma
25, and since  is bounded, it follows that there ex-
ists δ ∈ cut(ψ) such that cut(δ) = cut(ψ). Let
Y = {µ ∈ A : cut(µ) ⊂ cut(α)}. Let µ1 ∈ Y
such that µ1  µ for all µ ∈ Y . Let λ ∈ cut(µ1).
Hence cut(λ) ⊆ cut(µ1), from which follows that
cut(λ) ⊂ cut(α). Therefore λ ∈ Y . Let φ ∈ Y . It
follows that µ1  φ. Hence φ ∈ cut(µ1). Therefore
Y = cut(µ1). By Lemma 26 cut(ψ) ⊢ ψ. Hence,
since cut(δ) = cut(ψ) it follows that cut(δ) ⊢ ψ.
From cut(δ) ⊂ cut(α) it follows that δ ∈ Y . Hence
µ1  δ. Therefore cut(δ) ⊆ cut(µ1) = Y , and so
Y ⊢ ψ. Hence, for all ψ ∈ Cn(A) ÷ α it follows that
Y ⊢ ψ. Therefore, since Cn(A) ÷ α ⊢ β, it follows that
Y ⊢ β. Y ⊆ (Cn(A)÷α)∩A. Hence (Cn(A)÷α)∩A ⊢ β.
(⇒) Let A be a belief base and ÷ be an operator on
Cn(A). ÷ satisfies (÷1) to (÷4), (÷6), (÷9), base-
reduction, upper bound and lower bound. Let  be a binary
relation on A defined by:
α  β if and only if α 6∈ Cn(A)÷ β or ⊢ β.
We will prove that  is a bounded ensconcement.
(1) Let γ ∈ A \ Cn(∅) we must show that
H = {α ∈ A : γ ≺ α} 6⊢ γ. It is enough to show
that H \ Cn(∅) 6⊢ γ. Let α ∈ A \ Cn(∅) and γ ≺ α. Then,
γ  α and α 6 γ. Hence, by definition of , it follows that
γ 6∈ Cn(A)÷α, α ∈ Cn(A)÷γ and 6⊢ γ.H ⊆ Cn(A)÷γ
where, 6⊢ γ. Hence, since by (÷4) Cn(A)÷γ 6⊢ γ it follows
that H 6⊢ γ.
(2) Let α, β ∈ A be such that 6⊢ α and ⊢ β. From ⊢ β
it follows, by definition of , that α  β. Assume by
reductio that 6⊢ α, ⊢ β and β  α. Hence, by definition of
, β 6∈ Cn(A)÷ α or ⊢ α. Contradiction, since 6⊢ α and by
(÷1) β ∈ Cn(A) ÷ α.
(3) Follows trivially by definition of .
( is transitive) Let α  β and β  γ. Hence, by
definition of , it follows that (α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β or ⊢ β)
and (β 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ or ⊢ γ). Hence, α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β and
(β 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ or ⊢ γ) or (⊢ β and (β 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ or
⊢ γ)). Hence, we have four cases to consider:
Case 1) α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β and β 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ. From
(÷9) it follows that Cn(A) ÷ γ ⊆ Cn(A) ÷ β. Hence,
α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ. Therefore α  γ, by definition of .
Case 2) α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β and ⊢ γ. α  γ follows trivially
by definition of .
Case 3) ⊢ β and β 6∈ Cn(A)÷ γ. Contradicts (÷1).
Case 4) ⊢ β and ⊢ γ. α  γ follows trivially by definition
of .
( is connected) Let α 6 β. Hence α ∈ Cn(A) ÷ β and
6⊢ β. We will consider two cases:
Case 1) ⊢ α. Hence β  α, by definition of .
Case 2) 6⊢ α. Hence, by ÷ expulsiveness, β 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ α.
Therefore, by definition of , β  α.
( is well-ranked) Let X ⊆ A a non empty set. We will
prove by cases:
Case 1) X ⊆ Cn(∅). Trivial.
Case 2) X 6⊆ Cn(∅). Let X ′ = X \ Cn(∅). Hence,
by ÷ upper bound there exists β ∈ X ′ such that
Cn(A) ÷ α ⊆ Cn(A) ÷ β for all α ∈ X ′. By (÷4)
β 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ α for all α ∈ X ′. Hence, by definition of
, there exists β ∈ X ′ such that β  α for all α ∈ X ′. If
X = X ′ trivial. Assume now thatX 6= X ′. Let γ ∈ X \X ′.
Hence ⊢ γ and by ( 2) it follows that β  γ. Therefore,
there exists β ∈ X such that β  α for all α ∈ X .
( is inversely well-ranked) Let X ⊆ A a non empty set.
We will consider two cases:
Case 1)X ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Let β ∈ X ∩ Cn(∅) hence, by
definition of , α  β for all α ∈ X .
Case 2)X ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Hence, by ÷ lower bound, there
exists β ∈ X such that Cn(A) ÷ β ⊆ Cn(A) ÷ α, for all
α ∈ X . By (÷4) α 6∈ Cn(A)÷ β, for all α ∈ X . Hence, by
definition of  there exists β ∈ X such that α  β, for all
α ∈ X .
We have proved that  is a bounded ensconcement.
Let ≤ be as in Definition 3. According to Observa-
tion 4 and Observation 5 ≤ is a bounded epistemic
entrenchment related to Cn(A). It remains to show that
Cn(A)÷ α = Cn(A)÷≤ α, where÷≤ is defined (as in(R≤))by:
Cn(A)÷≤ α ={
Cn(A) ∩ {ψ : α < ψ} if α ∈ Cn(A)and 6⊢ α
Cn(A) otherwise
According to Lemma 24 and since ÷ is a severe with-
drawal function, the epistemic entrenchment ≤ on which ÷
is based on is such that: α ≤ β if and only if α 6∈ Cn(A)÷β
or ⊢ β. Thus to prove that Cn(A) ÷ α = Cn(A) ÷≤ α it
is enough to show that:
α ≤ β if and only if α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β or ⊢ β.
(⇒) Let α ≤ β. Hence, by definition of ≤, α ≤ β if
and only if:
i) α 6∈ Cn(A), or
ii) α, β ∈ Cn(A) and cut(β) ⊆ cut(α).
We will prove by cases:
Case 1) α 6∈ Cn(A). Then, by (÷2), α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β.
Case 2) α, β ∈ Cn(A) and cut(β) ⊆ cut(α).
Case 2.1) ⊢ β. Trivial.
Case 2.2) 6⊢ β.
{γ ∈ A : {δ ∈ A : γ ≺ δ} 6⊢ β} ⊆ {γ ∈ A : {δ ∈ A : γ ≺
δ} 6⊢ α}.
Hence,
{γ ∈ A : {δ ∈ A : (γ 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A) ÷
γ and 6⊢ γ) or (⊢ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A)÷ γ and 6⊢ γ)} 6⊢ β} ⊆
{γ ∈ A : {δ ∈ A : (γ 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A) ÷
γ and 6⊢ γ) or (⊢ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ and 6⊢ γ)} 6⊢ α}.
Therefore according to (÷1) and (÷4),
X = {γ ∈ A : {δ ∈ A : (γ 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ δ and δ ∈
Cn(A)÷γ) or (⊢ δ and 6⊢ γ)} 6⊢ β} ⊆ Y = {γ ∈ A : {δ ∈
A : (γ 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A) ÷ γ) or (⊢ δ and 6⊢
γ)} 6⊢ α}. Assume by reductio that α ∈ Cn(A) ÷ β.
From α ∈ Cn(A) ÷ β it follows, by base-reduction, that
Cn(A) ÷ β ∩ A ⊢ α. By compactness, there exists a fi-
nite subset of Cn(A)÷ β ∩A, H = {α1, ..., αn}, such that
H ⊢ α. Let us assume that H ∩Cn(∅) = ∅. For all αi ∈ H ,
αi ∈ Cn(A)÷ β = Cn(A) ÷ β
′
, for some β′ ∈ A (by Ob-
servation 17). Hence, by expulsiveness, β′ 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ αi.
Therefore β′ 6∈ Y , since H ⊆ Z = {δ ∈ A : (β′ 6∈
Cn(A) ÷ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A) ÷ β′) or (⊢ δ and 6⊢ β′)}. On
the other hand β′ ∈ X , since Z ⊆ Cn(A)÷β′, and by (÷4)
Cn(A)÷ β′ 6⊢ β. Hence X 6⊆ Y . Contradiction.
(⇐) Let α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β or ⊢ β. We will prove by cases:
Case 1) α 6∈ Cn(A). Trivial.
Case 2) α ∈ Cn(A).
Case 2.1) ⊢ β. Then α, β ∈ Cn(A) and cut(β) ⊆
cut(α).
Case 2.2) α 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ β and 6⊢ β. Hence, it follows that
β ∈ Cn(A), 6⊢ α and Cn(A) ÷ β ⊆ Cn(A) ÷ α, by (÷3),
(÷1) and (÷9), respectively. Let us assume by reductio that
cut(β) 6⊆ cut(α). Hence there exists ψ ∈ A such that
ψ ∈ cut(β) and ψ 6∈ cut(α). From which follows that
6⊢ ψ, C = {δ ∈ A : (ψ 6∈ Cn(A) ÷ δ and δ ∈ Cn(A) ÷
ψ) or (⊢ δ and 6⊢ ψ)} 6⊢ β and C ⊢ α. C ⊆ Cn(A) ÷ ψ.
Then Cn(A) ÷ ψ ⊢ α. Hence, by (÷4) and linearity, it fol-
lows that Cn(A) ÷ α ⊂ Cn(A) ÷ ψ. From Cn(A) ÷ β ⊆
Cn(A) ÷ α it follows that Cn(A) ÷ β ⊂ Cn(A) ÷ ψ.
By (÷9), β ∈ Cn(A) ÷ ψ. Therefore, by base-reduction,
Cn(A)÷ψ∩A ⊢ β. On the other handCn(A)÷ψ∩A ⊆ C.
Hence C ⊢ β. Contradiction.
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